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AN ABSTRACT OF THE RESEARCH PAPER OF 
 
SRIKANTH UPPALAUNCHI, for the Master of Science degree, presented on 
May 6th 2011, at Southern Illinois University Carbondale.  
 CORRUPTION AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
 
MAJOR PROFESSOR:  Dr. Scott Gilbert 
 
Previous findings of economic literature pointed out that there is significant 
correlation between corruption and trade. However, this study was based on under 
developing countries. The model used in this study is similar to the model used by 
Wanjala and Pierre‘s gravity model but with few changes in the model. 
This study develops and estimates the relationship between corruption and trade among 
developing nations and under developing nations. Wanjala and Pierre use the gravity model 
to estimate the effect of corruption on trade. In this paper I will use a similar model, but 
will not focus on border effects.  
Paper concludes that decrease in corruption increases the trade flow. Further 
research needs to be done to examine if corruption helps increase in economic growth. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
There is considerable literature on corruption and the effect of corruption on 
growth in developing countries. Travares (2005) suggests that democratization plays an 
important role in creation of corruption in any particular country. He also suggests that 
the longer it takes the country to reform from a non-democratic to a democratized state, 
the higher the level of corruption. There is literature on how corruption effects growth in 
developing countries, and whether corruption increases or decreases trade.   
Many studies suggest that corruption exists due to the reforms taken by the 
government. Dai Changzheng (2010) concludes that while China has made many reforms 
to combat corruption, it has failed to decrease corruption. Furthermore, he suggests that 
the solution is China should become a democratic country to combat corruption. Alan 
Heston & Vijay Kumar (Institutional Flaws and Corruption Incentives in India, 2008) 
suggest that India has achieved respectable high levels of economic growth, but the 
corruption level has also increased with growth.  They argue that it’s difficult for India to 
achieve its economic potential while the corruption level increases with growth of the 
economy.   
Jacob Wanjala Musila and Simon Pierre Sigue (2010) conclude that corruption 
and international trade are related. They also find that the corruption in African countries 
and corruption in their trading partners adversely affects the flow of exports and imports.  
Wanjala and Sigue use empirical data to analyze the effect of corruption in African 
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nations. They study the effect of the level of corruption in both trading partners – in both 
exporting and importing countries.  
In this paper I will estimate the effect of corruption on a few of the largest and 
fastest growing economies in South Asia and Southeast Asia. Wanjala and Pierre use the 
gravity model to estimate the effect of corruption on trade. In this paper I will use a 
similar model, but will not focus on border effects.  
In Section 2, I will explain corruption in the selected Asian countries for the 
model. In Section 3 I will explain how corruption affects trade in Asian countries. Section 
4 will explain the methodology and the data used to estimate the model. Section 5 will 
show reports of the estimation and Section 6 will give the conclusions of the model. 
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CHAPTER 2   
CORRUPTION IN ASIAN COUNTRIES 
  
 Asia consists of the world’s largest and fastest-growing economies. Asia also 
has the highest population in the world.  I have chosen the following Asian countries, 
which include a mix of developed and developing economies: Bangladesh, India, China, 
Hong Kong, Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia.  
“If you want to buy a Sherman tank, a Red Cross blanket, or simply speed up the 
installation of a telephone, there is probably no easier place in the world in which to do 
just that than in Asia – if you are willing to part with some cash, that is. With pathetically 
few exceptions, the countries in this region are so riddled with corruption that the paying 
of ‘tea money’ has become almost a way of life” (Far East Economic Review, 1974, 3).  
India has the second largest population. Its ranking has dropped to 87 (out of 178) 
in being one of the more corrupted countries. Corruption is way of life. For example, 
opening an internet café would take more time if one follows procedure to get a permit 
from the government. The process goes much faster if officials are bribed.  . 
Riley (1998) classifies corruption in African societies into three categories- 
incidental, systematic and systemic. Incidental corruption is petty corruption like 
watching pirated movies, which only affects the profits of movie makers. Other examples 
include individual government employees or police. Border police taking bribes and 
allowing goods to be smuggled illegally will affect that particular goods market.  
Systematic corruption is more pervasive, because it includes government 
organizations. For example construction contractors who bid to get a contract would 
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bribe the government organizations, then – in order to cover cost bribery – they decrease 
the quality of construction materials.   
Systemic corruption is organized corruption which involves the government, 
where it is irrational to be honest because being corrupt is the only way to live. Examples 
of countries with systemic corruption are Sierra Leone and Zaire. In Sierra Leone’s case, 
systemic corruption was associated with President Siaka Stevens’ one-man rule of 1968–
85 and the one-party All People’s Congress regime that lasted until 1992. These 
corruption cases involved extensive theft of government revenues, which were mainly 
generated through official and smuggled export trade in diamonds, gold, other minerals 
and agricultural produce. Another example: the famous Bofors Gun Scandal in India, 
where the late Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was accused of receiving kickbacks up to 
Rs.400 million from Bofors AB.  
These types of corruption are more or less found in every developing country. In 
the international business arena, corruption is more difficult to define and control, since 
the perception of right and wrong (both morally and legally) tends to vary extensively 
from culture to culture (Wines and Napier, 1992). Corruption varies from culture to 
culture: for instance in Africa, South Asia and South east Asia, corruption is similar but 
occurs at different levels of organization. Habib Zafarullah and Noorealsam Siddique 
(2001), suggest that corruption in the public sector in Bangladesh does not work in 
isolation: it is fostered by corrupt acts of political leaders in power. The politicians in 
Bangladesh are believed to be involved in large-scale corruption – which is 
administrative corruption or systemic corruption. 
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CHAPTER 3 
CORRUPTION TRADE NEXUS 
  
Recent literature suggests that corruption can affect international trade in many 
different ways. In some areas, it can actually improve trade, but it is not healthy for the 
economic growth. Corruption can also impact investment or FDI. According to Drabek 
and Payne 2001, and Smarzynska and Wei (2000), advanced firms are less willing to 
invest in a country where corruption is high.  
There are many papers on the relationship between corruption and international 
trade.  Some researchers have shown that corruption reduces total capital imports 
(Lambsdorff, 1999).  A few researchers (Bai and Wei, 2001) also suggest that more 
corrupt countries are more likely to impose capital controls as government’s ability to 
collect tax revenue decreases. Some suggest that capital controls may breed corruption 
(Edwards 1999).  
Channels through which corruption effects trade include the efficiency channel, 
transactions cost or price mark-up, and contract awarding. The efficiency channel can 
improve economic growth, or it might backfire and impede economic growth. An 
example: bribing officials to speed up the permit process to open a liquor bar. This type 
of corruption helps the economy grow. Leff (1964) and Huntington (1968) suggest that 
efficiency channel corruption will make the government officials work harder, and also 
suggest that bribes can bypass bureaucratic delays. This can backfire, if those same 
officials have taken bribes to delay the process. Myrdal (1968) suggests that corrupt 
government officials can also create unwanted bureaucratic delays in order to get more 
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bribes. Kaufman and Wei (1999) suggest that firms that pay more bribes are likely to 
spend more time managing bureaucrats in negotiating deals, which results in higher cost 
of capital. 
In the case of transaction cost or price mark-up channel, Shleifer and Visny(1993) 
and Bardhan (1997) suggest that government agents may levy bribes that are lower than 
the official tax. In such cases, shipments can get into the country at a lower transaction 
cost. This decreased cost will reduce the price of that good and will in turn increase trade. 
In other situations, agents might levy taxes higher than the government taxes, which will 
impact prices and decrease trade. This kind of corruption is found more with customs 
officials at airports or harbors. In these situations, exporters and importers will be forced 
to make an extra payment to the agent, which is tantamount to a monthly salary for the 
agent. If exporters and importers do not pay the extra tax to the agent, then there is a good 
chance the shipment will be lost. In order to cover this tax, the exporter or the importer 
has to increase the price of goods, which will in turn decrease the demand for that good 
and will decrease trade.  
The third channel is the contract-awarding channel, where the contractors or the 
dealers pay the bribe in order to get the contract from the government. One good example 
is the Bofors Gun Scandal in India, where Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was accused of 
taking an award of Rs. Rs.400 million. This demonstrates that exporting and importing 
firms are willing to engage in corrupt practices and to gain advantage over those who 
cannot afford to pay bribes.  
Jacob Wanjala and Simon Pierre have studied Africa – a continent with more than 
45 countries rich in natural resources, but with a high level of corruption. They have used 
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47 African countries with 180 trading partners to test the effect of corruption on trade. I 
am choosing seven countries from Asia which have similar cultural beliefs and diversity. 
These Asian countries have been colonized by Britain and have diverse populations. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DATA DESCRIPTION 
 
The countries that I have selected are Bangladesh, India, China, Hong Kong, 
Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. These seven countries have backgrounds similar to 
African nations. Countries like India, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand 
have diverse cultures, and these cultures have different definitions of corruption. China 
and Hong Kong have the same government but different trade policies.  
I have several reasons for choosing these countries: Asian countries represent 
60% of the world's population; while India and China combined represent 37% of world's 
population. In terms of economic development, India and China have the largest 
economies. Singapore is a developed country with relatively low corruption (compared to 
other Asian countries.)  
One of the main reasons for selecting these countries is that all these countries 
export similar goods and also import similar goods. These countries export most of their 
goods to developed countries and there is considerable competition between countries for 
these markets. According to UNCTAD, China exported ICT goods valued at $356 billion 
in 2009, followed by Hong Kong with $142 billion. The United States tops the list of ICT 
importers. India's exports increased by a dramatic 244% and Malaysia by 18%.  
Countries like India and Malaysia have high corruption but are still able to increase trade 
with countries which are among the least corrupted or are only moderately corrupted.  
Lambsdorff (1998) and Anderson and Marcouiller (1999) both have used the 
gravity equation formulation in their cross-country analyses. The gravity equation treats 
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corruption as a trade deterrent or catalyst variable. This will allow both the possibilities: 
that corruption can increase, or corruption can decrease trade between a pair of countries. 
The main question is if corruption increases or decreases trade flow in Asian countries. 
According to the gravity model of bilateral trade, the flow of trade is related to the size of 
and distance between the trading partners. The combined effect of the size and distance 
factors can be expressed as the product of the output of the two trading partners, divided 
by the distance between them. In this paper, the gravity parameter is calculated as the 
product of the gross domestic product of trading partners, divided by the distance 
between them.  
Jacob and Simone’s model consists of other factors: common geographic border, 
common language (CL) as cultural factor, and common currency and regional trade 
agreements (RTA) as regulatory factors. In this paper, I have ignored some of the 
parameters like common border, regional trade agreements, and common currency. These 
are more applicable for African nations as all the countries are in one continent and most 
of these countries have different tribal languages and also have regional trade 
agreements. The countries selected for this paper are more globalized and have a high 
flow of trade volume, which shows that they have flexible trade agreements and have less 
border effect.  
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CHPATER 5  
METHODOLOGY OF ESTIMATIONS 
 
I have focused on gravity parameter, common language (cultural differences) and 
corruption. The equation used in this paper is more simplistic than Jacob and Simone's 
paper, as the countries selected for this paper are only seven and do not share the same 
factors that affect trade.  The focus of this paper is to test the effect of corruption in south 
Asia and Southeast Asian countries using the gravity model. 
Equation I 
Log(imports) = β +β1log(gravity)+ β2 Cl(common language) + β3CF ( Freedom 
from corruption). 
 
Equation II 
Log(Exports) = β +β1log(gravity)+ β2 Cl(common language) + β3CF ( Freedom 
from corruption). 
I have tested these equations for each individual country (Parent Country: 
Bangladesh, India, China, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore). Imports are 
all the imports from parent countries to their trading partners and exports are all exports 
from the parent country to their trading partners. Gravity is the product of GDP in current 
billion dollars of parent countries to their trading partners. For measurement of corruption 
I have used the freedom from corruption parameter from the Heritage Foundation.  
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Corruption erodes economic freedom by introducing insecurity and uncertainty 
into economic relationships. The score for this component is derived primarily from 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) for 2009, which 
measures the level of corruption in 180 countries. The CPI is based on a 10-point scale in 
which a score of 10 indicates very little corruption and a score of 0 indicates a very 
corrupt government. In scoring freedom from corruption, the Index converts the raw CPI 
data to a scale of 0 to 100 by multiplying the CPI score by 10. For example, if a country’s 
raw CPI data score is 5.5, its overall freedom from corruption score is 55.  I estimate the 
empirical model in Equation 1 using annual data for the period 1996 to 2006 of seven 
south Asian and southeast Asian countries, to and from 66 trading partners. The nominal 
GDP is obtained from International Financial Statistics /International Monetary Fund's 
World Economic Outlook Database. The export and import data (in millions of dollars) 
are obtained from the International Monetary Fund's Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) 
yearbooks.  
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CHAPTER 6 
ESTIMATION OUTPUTS AND CONCLUSION 
 
I have used the basic estimation technique (i.e. ordinary least squares method) and 
have estimated the data for each country for each year – which showed different results. 
The results of specific years showed that for certain years, there is a positive relationship 
between gravity and trade, and for certain years it showed that there is negative 
relationship. Since we have used freedom of corruption (assuming there is positive 
relationship between trade and freedom of corruption), then it means that less corruption 
will lead to more trade. I have tested the average data for ten years for each parent 
country and the results indicate that there is a positive relationship between flow of trade, 
and gravity, and freedom from corruption. The empirical analysis shows that corruption 
decreases trade, and corruption is trade barrier.  
For Bangladesh, estimation of Equation 1 shows that there is a positive 
relationship between trade and these three factors: distance, common language, freedom 
from corruption. If freedom from corruption increases, then flow of imports increases. 
But for exports, increase in distance would decrease the flow of exports.  
For China, the estimation of Equation I show that there is a negative relationship 
between language and imports, which indicates that not having a common language, is 
barrier. Estimation for the countries of India, Malaysia and Thailand have indicated that a 
decrease in corruption will increase the flow of trade.  
The hypothesis is that corruption decreases trade.  We fail to reject the hypothesis, 
because estimation for all our selected countries shows that decrease in corruption 
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increases the flow of trade. However there are examples which show that corruption can 
increase unilateral trade. For example, consider two firms: firm A (foreign country) and 
firm B (home country) in an open economy with single good market. Firm A (from a 
foreign company) can bribe the government officials in the home country, and export its 
goods into the home country. This will increase the imports of this product in the home 
country. In this case (assuming that firm A is more efficient than firm B), firm B will shut 
down and this will affect the welfare of the home country. Unless the government of 
home country enacts policies which will help firm B to survive in this situation, it will be 
difficult for firm B to stay in the market.  
However more research needs to be done on such cases to show that corruption 
improves trade but is bad the for the country’s economy. There could be many other co-
factors like literacy rate or poverty, which encourage corruption to effect flow of trade. 
Further research needs to done on these factors and co-factors. 
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Table 1  
Bangladesh Imports and Exports 
Dependent Variable: LOG(IMPORT)  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/05/11   Time: 11:16   
Sample: 1996 2006 IF IMPORT>0 AND BANGLADESH_GRAVITY >0 
Periods included: 11   
Cross-sections included: 41   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 370  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 2.461591 0.743725 3.309813 0.0010 
LOG(BANGLADESH_GRAVITY) 0.045079 0.126299 0.356926 0.7214 
COMMON_LANGUAGE 3.180944 0.411618 7.727909 0.0000 
CORRUPTION_FREEDOM 0.049051 0.005311 9.236565 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.249194    Mean dependent var 5.286872 
Adjusted R-squared 0.243040    S.D. dependent var 2.890977 
S.E. of regression 2.515250    Akaike info criterion 4.693373 
Sum squared resid 2315.493    Schwarz criterion 4.735682 
Log likelihood -864.2741    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.710179 
F-statistic 40.49201    Durbin-Watson stat 0.058194 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     Dependent Variable: LOG(EXPORTS)  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/05/11   Time: 11:21   
Sample: 1996 2006 IF EXPORTS>0 AND BANGLADESH_GRAVITY >0 
Periods included: 11   
Cross-sections included: 44   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 414  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.365446 0.700705 0.521539 0.6023 
LOG(BANGLADESH_GRAVITY
) -0.320165 0.119752 -2.673558 0.0078 
COMMON_LANGUAGE 1.589603 0.396493 4.009159 0.0001 
CORRUPTION_FREEDOM 0.048157 0.004911 9.805356 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.213712    Mean dependent var 4.719016 
Adjusted R-squared 0.207959    S.D. dependent var 2.799608 
S.E. of regression 2.491558    Akaike info criterion 4.673309 
Sum squared resid 2545.224    Schwarz criterion 4.712206 
Log likelihood -963.3749    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.688691 
F-statistic 37.14592    Durbin-Watson stat 0.064641 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table 2 
China (Imports and Exports) 
Dependent Variable: LOG(IMPORT)  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/05/11   Time: 11:16   
Sample: 1996 2006 IF IMPORT>0 AND CHINAMAIN_GRAVITY >0 
Periods included: 11   
Cross-sections included: 52   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 461  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 5.386524 0.088057 61.17075 0.0000 
LOG(CHINAMAIN_GRAVIT
Y) 0.837100 0.011081 75.54655 0.0000 
COMMON_LANGUAGE -0.791523 0.092871 -8.522779 0.0000 
CORRUPTION_FREEDOM 0.010090 0.001377 7.325148 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.944922    Mean dependent var 4.723198 
Adjusted R-squared 0.944561    S.D. dependent var 2.708664 
S.E. of regression 0.637770    Akaike info criterion 1.946960 
Sum squared resid 185.8849    Schwarz criterion 1.982825 
Log likelihood -444.7743    Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.961082 
F-statistic 2613.455    Durbin-Watson stat 0.038531 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
Dependent Variable: LOG(EXPORTS)  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/05/11   Time: 11:21   
Sample: 1996 2006 IF EXPORTS>0 AND CHINAMAIN_GRAVITY >0 
Periods included: 11   
Cross-sections included: 51   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 443  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 3.780318 0.345790 10.93241 0.0000 
LOG(CHINAMAIN_GRAVIT
Y) 0.381138 0.042481 8.972048 0.0000 
COMMON_LANGUAGE 0.167408 0.357317 0.468515 0.6396 
CORRUPTION_FREEDOM 0.029873 0.005371 5.561386 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.296257    Mean dependent var 4.882749 
Adjusted R-squared 0.291448    S.D. dependent var 2.888586 
S.E. of regression 2.431483    Akaike info criterion 4.623868 
Sum squared resid 2595.415    Schwarz criterion 4.660830 
Log likelihood -1020.187    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.638445 
F-statistic 61.60248    Durbin-Watson stat 0.033963 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table 3 
Hong-Kong (Imports and Exports) 
Dependent Variable: LOG(IMPORT)  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/05/11   Time: 11:16   
Sample: 1996 2006 IF IMPORT>0 AND HONG_KONG_GRAVITY >0 
Periods included: 10   
Cross-sections included: 50   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 411  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 3.636822 0.592899 6.133961 0.0000 
LOG(HONG_KONG_GRAVITY) 0.428600 0.113136 3.788351 0.0002 
COMMON_LANGUAGE 1.789665 0.350627 5.104181 0.0000 
CORRUPTION_FREEDOM 0.057436 0.004715 12.18072 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.286546    Mean dependent var 4.720929 
Adjusted R-squared 0.281287    S.D. dependent var 2.737917 
S.E. of regression 2.321121    Akaike info criterion 4.531663 
Sum squared resid 2192.755    Schwarz criterion 4.570773 
Log likelihood -927.2567    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.547134 
F-statistic 54.48814    Durbin-Watson stat 0.216109 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
Dependent Variable: LOG(EXPORTS)  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/05/11   Time: 11:21   
Sample: 1996 2006 IF EXPORTS>0 AND HONG_KONG_GRAVITY >0 
Periods included: 10   
Cross-sections included: 59   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 517  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 3.009180 0.577401 5.211594 0.0000 
LOG(HONG_KONG_GRAVITY) 0.253723 0.110390 2.298431 0.0219 
COMMON_LANGUAGE 1.905036 0.366515 5.197700 0.0000 
CORRUPTION_FREEDOM 0.052070 0.004445 11.71308 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.231276    Mean dependent var 4.336435 
Adjusted R-squared 0.226781    S.D. dependent var 2.889103 
S.E. of regression 2.540472    Akaike info criterion 4.710284 
Sum squared resid 3310.900    Schwarz criterion 4.743150 
Log likelihood -1213.608    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.723162 
F-statistic 51.44665    Durbin-Watson stat 0.157058 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table 4 
India (Imports and Exports) 
Dependent Variable: LOG(IMPORT)  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/15/11   Time: 23:41   
Sample: 1996 2006 IF IMPORT>0 AND INDIA_GRAVITY >0 
Periods included: 9   
Cross-sections included: 51   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 378  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 1.504022 0.921123 1.632815 0.1033 
LOG(INDIA_GRAVITY) -0.033598 0.202962 -0.165536 0.8686 
COMMON_LANGUAGE 2.514542 0.375127 6.703175 0.0000 
CORRUPTION_FREEDOM 0.056711 0.005354 10.59302 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.256814    Mean dependent var 4.839122 
Adjusted R-squared 0.250853    S.D. dependent var 2.861616 
S.E. of regression 2.476823    Akaike info criterion 4.662356 
Sum squared resid 2294.360    Schwarz criterion 4.703995 
Log likelihood -877.1853    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.678882 
F-statistic 43.07959    Durbin-Watson stat 0.315124 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
     
 
Dependent Variable: LOG(EXPORTS)  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/15/11   Time: 23:49   
Sample: 1996 2006 IF EXPORTS>0 AND INDIA_GRAVITY >0 
Periods included: 9   
Cross-sections included: 59   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 469  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 2.395304 0.842363 2.843553 0.0047 
LOG(INDIA_GRAVITY) 0.114627 0.187193 0.612345 0.5406 
COMMON_LANGUAGE 1.588391 0.367974 4.316585 0.0000 
CORRUPTION_FREEDOM 0.050933 0.004834 10.53685 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.201833    Mean dependent var 4.366290 
Adjusted R-squared 0.196684    S.D. dependent var 2.859847 
S.E. of regression 2.563221    Akaike info criterion 4.728899 
Sum squared resid 3055.097    Schwarz criterion 4.764298 
Log likelihood -1104.927    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.742827 
F-statistic 39.19504    Durbin-Watson stat 0.277675 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table 5 
Malaysia (Imports and exports) 
Dependent Variable: LOG(IMPORT)  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/15/11   Time: 23:41   
Sample: 1996 2006 IF IMPORT>0 AND MALAYSIA_GRAVITY >0 
Periods included: 11   
Cross-sections included: 53   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 472  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 2.019201 0.511394 3.948430 0.0001 
LOG(MALAYSIA_GRAVIT
Y) 0.066942 0.074095 0.903460 0.3667 
COMMON_LANGUAGE 2.758684 0.317532 8.687882 0.0000 
CORRUPTION_FREEDOM 0.056174 0.004786 11.73732 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.261717    Mean dependent var 4.880436 
Adjusted R-squared 0.256984    S.D. dependent var 2.864464 
S.E. of regression 2.469121    Akaike info criterion 4.654040 
Sum squared resid 2853.189    Schwarz criterion 4.689268 
Log likelihood -1094.353    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.667897 
F-statistic 55.30106    Durbin-Watson stat 0.066046 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
 
 
Dependent Variable: LOG(EXPORTS)  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/15/11   Time: 23:49   
Sample: 1996 2006 IF EXPORTS>0 AND MALAYSIA_GRAVITY >0 
Periods included: 11   
Cross-sections included: 61   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 590  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 2.008525 0.452173 4.441943 0.0000 
LOG(MALAYSIA_GRAVIT
Y) 0.035759 0.068576 0.521450 0.6023 
COMMON_LANGUAGE 1.933334 0.304370 6.351922 0.0000 
CORRUPTION_FREEDOM 0.051983 0.004193 12.39752 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.223465    Mean dependent var 4.368470 
Adjusted R-squared 0.219490    S.D. dependent var 2.852683 
S.E. of regression 2.520246    Akaike info criterion 4.693346 
Sum squared resid 3722.060    Schwarz criterion 4.723042 
Log likelihood -1380.537    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.704915 
F-statistic 56.21151    Durbin-Watson stat 0.046902 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table 6 
Singapore (Imports and Exports) 
Dependent Variable: LOG(IMPORT)  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/15/11   Time: 23:41   
Sample: 1996 2006 IF IMPORT>0 AND SINGAPORE_GRAVITY >0 
Periods included: 9   
Cross-sections included: 52   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 387  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 7.938191 1.198567 6.623068 0.0000 
LOG(SINGAPORE_GRAVITY) 1.266086 0.234488 5.399370 0.0000 
COMMON_LANGUAGE 2.026164 0.362066 5.596119 0.0000 
CORRUPTION_FREEDOM 0.057905 0.005078 11.40284 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.315284    Mean dependent var 4.912377 
Adjusted R-squared 0.309921    S.D. dependent var 2.868124 
S.E. of regression 2.382579    Akaike info criterion 4.584526 
Sum squared resid 2174.170    Schwarz criterion 4.625440 
Log likelihood -883.1058    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.600750 
F-statistic 58.78543    Durbin-Watson stat 0.367617 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
Dependent Variable: LOG(EXPORTS)  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/15/11   Time: 23:49   
Sample: 1996 2006 IF EXPORTS>0 AND SINGAPORE_GRAVITY >0 
Periods included: 9   
Cross-sections included: 61   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 485  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 4.728037 1.141354 4.142482 0.0000 
LOG(SINGAPORE_GRAVITY) 0.575457 0.220067 2.614914 0.0092 
COMMON_LANGUAGE 1.573438 0.363867 4.324212 0.0000 
CORRUPTION_FREEDOM 0.051431 0.004638 11.08792 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.229677    Mean dependent var 4.358748 
Adjusted R-squared 0.224872    S.D. dependent var 2.871762 
S.E. of regression 2.528338    Akaike info criterion 4.701215 
Sum squared resid 3074.790    Schwarz criterion 4.735723 
Log likelihood -1136.045    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.714773 
F-statistic 47.80438    Durbin-Watson stat 0.283548 
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Table 7 
Thailand (Imports and Exports) 
Dependent Variable: LOG(IMPORT)  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/15/11   Time: 23:41   
Sample: 1996 2006 IF IMPORT>0 AND THAILAND_GRAVITY >0 
Periods included: 9   
Cross-sections included: 52   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 388  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 4.159648 1.173510 3.544622 0.0004 
LOG(THAILAND_GRAVIT
Y) 0.481931 0.214391 2.247913 0.0251 
COMMON_LANGUAGE 2.434361 0.374067 6.507819 0.0000 
CORRUPTION_FREEDOM 0.056892 0.005214 10.91239 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.279750    Mean dependent var 4.900034 
Adjusted R-squared 0.274123    S.D. dependent var 2.864157 
S.E. of regression 2.440217    Akaike info criterion 4.632307 
Sum squared resid 2286.589    Schwarz criterion 4.673142 
Log likelihood -894.6675    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.648497 
F-statistic 49.71597    Durbin-Watson stat 0.160057 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
 
Dependent Variable: LOG(EXPORTS)  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/15/11   Time: 23:49   
Sample: 1996 2006 IF EXPORTS>0 AND THAILAND_GRAVITY >0 
Periods included: 9   
Cross-sections included: 61   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 487  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 2.293505 1.048033 2.188390 0.0291 
LOG(THAILAND_GRAVIT
Y) 0.105046 0.192715 0.545084 0.5859 
COMMON_LANGUAGE 1.875596 0.361975 5.181568 0.0000 
CORRUPTION_FREEDOM 0.052767 0.004687 11.25767 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.225021    Mean dependent var 4.327551 
Adjusted R-squared 0.220207    S.D. dependent var 2.883267 
S.E. of regression 2.546094    Akaike info criterion 4.715178 
Sum squared resid 3131.094    Schwarz criterion 4.749578 
Log likelihood -1144.146    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.728692 
F-statistic 46.74749    Durbin-Watson stat 0.131982 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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